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QUICK POINT PENCIL CO. 
Cert to CA 8 
(Ross, Lay; 
Larson, DJ, dissenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr objects to CA 8 1 s invalidation, on the basis 
of a conflict with federal patent policy, of an agreement requiring 
resp to pay her royalties "as long as you continue to sell" a product 
devised by petr. 
2. FACTS: In 1956, petr developed a fairly simple form of 
~ pocket key holder and entered into an exclusive manufacture and sale 
. 
~ 04! ~~ 'J . - ~~~~- . 
~ ~/ . --------------"li,f/l ~\ u ~ ~~ ~d,,,~~~~ 
- -
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<e agreement with resp. The agreement provided that resp "will have the 
exclusive right to make and sell key holders of the type shown in your 
[patent] application," and would pay petr a royalty of 5% of the 
selling price. (Petn, appx., p. A30) The agreement further provided 
that, if the patent application was not allowed within five years, 
resp would pay petr a royalty of 2 1/~/o, "as long as you continue to 
sell same." (Petn, appx., p. A32) Petr's patent application was 
rejected, and in 1961 the Board of Patent Appeals held it an unpatentabli 
invention. Nevertheless, resp continued to pay royalties until 1975, 
when competitors began to copy the key holder, cutting into resp's 
market. Resp then brought this action for a declaratory judgment in 
• the DC (E.D. Mo., Merrideth, J.), seeking relief from the payment of 
further royalties. 
The DC ruled for petr. It found, "The language of the agreement 
is plain, clear, and unequivocal and has no relation to whether--gr not ------a · patent is ever granted or is not granted." (Petn, appx., p. A23) 
The court distinguished Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 
U.S. 234 (1964), and Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 
(1964), which held that state law could not prohibit the copying of 
items held unpatentable. Nor was the case controlled by Lear, Inc. v. 
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), which held that state law could not bar 
a licensee from challenging the validity of the patent. Here, since 
- the contractual obligation to pay royalties bore no relation to whether 
or not a patent was granted, patent law posed no obstacle to the enforce 
- -
- 3 
• ment of the contract according to its terms. 
• 
A divided panel of CA 8 reversed. Judge Ross characterized 
resp as "a patent application licensee," and asked whether resp was 
bound to pay royalties "as long as it manufactures the item described 
in the patent application even though the licensor abandoned the 
application many years ago and the licensee's competitors are freely 
manufacturing the unpatented item." (Petn, appx., pp. A3-A4) (The 
· . .:.. 
court rejected the dissent's contention that the contract should be 
characterized as a "trade-secret license in agreement," since the 
"secret" of this key holder was given away the first time it was put 
on the market. ) The court began with the principle established by 
Stiffel and Lear that all ideas in general circulation are dedicated 
to the common good unless protected by a valid patent. The court noted 
that, under Lear, if petr had obtained a patent later ruled invalid, 
resp's liability would have terminated. The results should be no 
different here, where the Patent Office itself rejected the application. 
Furthermore, if a patent had been obtained and was valid, the royalty 
agreement, despite its terms, would expire by force of federal law at 
~ the end of the patent period, under Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 
~ f~\ (1964 ). The court saw no reason why petr's failure to patent her 
lP [PCY'f" l 
invention should put her in a better position. The court distinguished ~v. 
~~~- Kewanee Oil co. v. Bicron corp., 416 U.S. 417 (1974) , in which the 
/_ cJJ"' 
-~ court recognized that a state could provide protection for unpatentable 




• petr's key holder was the sort of invention which was fully disclosed 
the first time it was marketed. Thus, the protection authorized by 
Kewanee is not involved here. 
Judge Larson's dissent reiterated the DC's conclusion that resp's 
liability for royalties bore no relation to th8 patent application: 
~. 
V Judge 
"In retrospect, Quick Point made a bad bar-
gain. It agreed to pay royalties on the 
Aronson invention as long as it continued to 
make and sell the same, and the agreement, 
as the district court found, had no relation 
to whether or not the item was ever patented." 
(Petn, appx., p. A9) 
Larson agreed that the key holder might not be a trade secret 
in the Kewanee sense of the term, but it was a secret before petr dis-
• closed it to resp, and resp agreed to pay for that secret as long as 
it manufactured the key holders. He found the case indistinguishable 
from Warner-Lambe rt Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 
F.Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) affirmed 280 F.2d 197 (CA 2 1960). That 
case involved the secret formula for Listerine, which had ceased to . 
be a secret some years before that suit was brought. The court never-
theless held that Warner-Lambert was contractually bound to pay 
royalties despite the fact that its competitors had obtained the same 
formula for free. Judge Larson concluded that nothing in Lear would 
require a different result in this case. In Lear this Court held that 
a licensee must be allowed to attack the validity of a patent because 
- there was no better situat ed plaintiff to obtain the release of the 
idea into the public domain. Here, the design for the key holder i s 
- -
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i already in the public domain, and there is no public good to be served 
by relieving resp of its contractual obligations. Furthermore, Kewanee, 
supra at 486-487, specifically noted that trade secret licensing 
advanced the policy of getting ideas into the public domain since it 
enabled inventors to take advantage of existing manufacturing and 
marketing structures. The fact that the marketing of the product 
reveals the secret does not lead to a different result. So long as 
·to 
the arrangement does not provide "a significant disincentive/patent," 
(petn, appx., p. A-15) federal law does not bar its enforcement. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr largely repeats the arguments stated by 
the dissent. She contends that this decision conflicts with CA 2 1 s 
• decision in Warner-Lambert, and that it in no way advances the patent 
policy as described in Lear. She presents a fairly restrained parade 
of horribles, suggesting the implications of the decision: 
-
"It renders unenforceable every trade secret 
license where the trade secret later becnmes 
known to the trade for whatever reason. It 
also would render unenforceable every agree-
ment by which a previously undisclosed idea or 
article which is not patentable or protectable 
by copyright is licensed under continuing 
royalties." (Petn, p. 6) 
Resp emphasizes the majority's conclusion that this contract 
licensed a patent application, and not a trade secret. It contends 
that, if, under Lear, the invalidity of a patent relieves a licensee 
from further liability, certainly the inability to obtain a patent iu 
the first instance should provide the same relief. It contends that 




was involved in that case. Furthermore, the formula 
in Kewanee 
there involved/was a true trade secret, and not the sort of device 
which is fully disclosed as soon as it is marketed. Since CA 8 carefull~ 
limited its holding to patent applications, it does not endanger true 
trade secrets of the sort involved in Kewanee. ~s 4. DISCUSSION: I think petr is correct that CA 8 
~/ l,but I think resp is correct that CA S's reliance on the 
is dead wrong, 
presence of a 
patent application will keep this case from having the horrible conse-
quences foreseen by petr. It does seem to me that the dissent's 
reading of this contract is absolutely correct, and that no federal 
patent policy will be served by denying its enforcement. CA 8 has also 
- given an unnecessarily narrow reading to Kewanee, and the result here 
does conflict with CA 2's result in Warner-Lambert. However, 18 years 
have elapsed since Warner-Lambert, and it is entirely possible that 
CA 2 might reach a different decision today in light of more recent 
·-"'-C, 
patent cases. 
Thus, while I think the decision below is wrong, it is a fairly 
narrow opinion, and it does not se·em to establish the sort of conflict 
that cries out for resolution. 
There is a response. 
5/15/78 
CMS 
I would deny. 
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BOBTAIL BENCH .MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Eric 
DA TE : 1 2-5- 7 8 
RE: Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., No. 77-1413 
I. OVERVIEW 
Contrary to the impression given by the preliminary 
memorandum first written in this case, the issues presented are 
- not easy. Although on the particular facts the argument for 
- -
- reversal seems strong to me, a proper analysis requires an 
awareness of a broad range of legal and policy issues cutting 
across the fields of contract, patent, and anti-trust law. 
Because, until yesterday, I was a stranger to this kind of 
problem, I feel unsure of my understanding of the case. My 
recommendations therefore are tentative. 
My feeling at this point is that the decision should be 
reversed. I agree with amicus Ercon, however, that this is not 
an ideal case on its facts in which to decide issues having an 
important effect on the legal status of highly complex and 
commercially valuable intellectual property. It therefore might 
be especially important to "write narrowly" in this case, leaving 
open the important questions not presented here. Because the 
- briefs are ably written and the facts and proceedings below are 
uncomplex, I will not rehearse the prior history of the case. 
-
II. CHARACTERIZING THE CONTRACT 
Characterizing the contract in issue is crucial to the 
outcome of the case. The agreement is very poorly written, but 
the following conclusions seem clear to me. The parties 
contemplated that petr would apply for, and attempt to obtain, a 
patent on the device. They also anticipated that the patent 
might not issue and provided for indefinite, reduced royalties in 
that event. 
Resp's attempt to construe the contract differently 
strikes me as more desparate than reasoned. Resp's Brief at 48-
2. 
- -
- 53. I believe petr's reply brief adequately disposes of this 
argument~ Petr's Reply Brief at 6-10. 
A more substantial characterization problem relates to 
whether petr's invention was a trade secret at all. Resp uses 
most of its brief arguing that this device does not qualify as a 
trade secret at all, and that the decisions showing deference to 
state protection of trade secrets are therefore not really 
applicable. With all due respect to Erwin Griswold, this 
argument is transparent. Both the reply brief of petr and the 
SG's amicus brief convincingly demonstrate that petrs keyholder 
device fits well within the purposes for which production license 
and trade secret laws exist. Because of its preoccupation with 
what is really a non-issue, resp's brief is not particularly 
- helpful in dealing with the more difficult questions in the case. 
-
III. ISSUES 
Under the Court's recent decisions in this area, 
especially Kewanee -oil co~ v. Bicron ·corp:, 416 u.s. 470 (1974), 
the issue in this case is whether enforcing petr's contract with 
resp would so interfere with the policies underlying the federal 
patent system that federal preemption should apply. I have found 
it most helpful to approach this question in two steps: ( 1 ) If 
there had been no patent application involved in the agreement 
and petr had relied solely on her 2-1/2% royalty provision to 
exploit her invention, would enforcement of that contract be 
permissible under federal law? (2) If so, should the result be 
3. 
- -
- any different because a patent application was involved? 
A 
The starting point should be Kewanee. In that case the 
Court did not apply preemption to a state trade secret law that 
permitted an injunction against the use or disclosure of material 
until after it made its way legitimately into the public domain. 
The opinion discusses at length whether the existence of such 
protection would thwart the patent-law policies of encouraging 
innovation and giving the public the benefit of new ideas. The 
Court concluded that it would not: the protection of the patent 
system is generally so superior to that of state law (especially 
- since, after sears; ·Roebuck; ·& ·co~ v. Stiffel ·co~, 376 u.s. 225 
(1964), the States may not prevent the public copying of 
unpatentable ideas) that inventors will not be deterred from 
applying for federal patents. In addition, unpatentable ideas 
make an important commercial contribution; if the originators of 
such ideas could not count on receiving some protection under 
state law, they would tend to hoard their knowledge rather than 
disemminate it to those licensees in the best position to put it 
to public use. 
-
This case is distinguishable from Kewanee on its facts 
because the injuction there was limited to the life of the · 
secrecy of the trade secret. Here, by constrast, the contract 
sought to be enforced would exact royalties as long as resp 
chooses to manufacture the keyholders, long after secrecy was 
4. 
- -
- lost. In spite of this difference, I have a hard time seeing why 




that receiving a higher royalty from the sole manufacturer of a 
commercially successful product would not be any less attractive 
than receiving a lower royalty for a long or even an indefinite 
period from one of many competing manufacturers. Moreover, the 
. -
indefinite royalty provision is probably unusual, representing a 
careless bargain on the part of resp. One would expect an acute 
businessman to agree to pay no more than his estimate of the 
money value of the head-start he would receive from disclosure of 
the trade secret, knowing that his competitors eventually would 
be able to compete fully. ~ypically, a royalty of finite 
duration would constitute the core of a trade-secret license in 
which no patent is involved. I have found nothing in resp's 
..........___.. ------
brief that convinces me that inventors would bypass the patent 
system if trade-secret license agreements based on facts similar 
to those here are held to be generally enforceable • 
The real difficulty is in foreseeing whether the same is 
true of all or most trade secret licenses. The Ercon amicus -- ---
brief points out the vast range of ideas and forms of agreem~nt 
falling under the trade-secret rubric. It suggests some 
hypotheticals, pp. 21-22, in which contracts similar in form to 
the one in this case could have adverse economic effects if 
enforced. As I understand Ercon's argument, the problems it 
\ 
forecasts are more anti-competitive than anti-patent; i~e~, it is -
only when bargaining power is unequal due to superior economic 
strength in a licensor that trade secret licensing becomes 
5. 
- -
- troublesome. Ercon insists, p. 22 n.27, that the anti-trust laws 
are not an acceptable solution to this problem. 
Ercon's proposed solution to this case deserves some 
attention since it attempts to carve out a middle ground between 
complete preemption and no preemption. The proposal is to --enforce contracts such as the one here only to the extent they 
are reasonably related to the head-start value conferred by the 
disclosure of the trade secret to the licensee. The theory is 
appealing because it gives the inventor as much as he seems to 
"deserve," but no more. I have two difficulties with this 
proposal, however. First, I am not entirely convinced that this 
rule would truly further, other than indirectly, the twin patent-
law policies of promoting public disclosure and providing 
- incentives for invention. Rather, it seems to be more of an anti-
trust measure. To be sure, anti-trust and patent law are 
-
related, but it would be anomalous to hold that the patent laws 
preempt an otherwise binding contract solely because of its anti~ 
competitive ·effect. Second, as a practical matter, how is a 
court to judge the head-start value of an invention? The 
parties' agreement itself would seem to be the best indicator of 
this factual question, provided bargaining is at arms length. 
The length of the royalty payment period should not be 
dispositive; there is no reason why a licensee such as resp could 
not rationally decide that its head start value would adequately 
be represented by amortizing royalties over a long period of 
time, even past the point where competitors were freely copying 
the idea. In addition, it could be difficult to compute, even 
6. 
- -
- with the benefit of hindsight, what the head-start value actually 
was. (Ercon claims that such determinations are commonly made in 
state damages actions for violation of trade secret covenants, 
however.) 
Taken as a whole, it appears to me that Ercon's argument 
is basically that an anti-trust problem exists which the anti-
trust laws are incapable of solving; the Court should therefore 
adapt preemption doctrine to fill the gap. Although I question 
both Ercon's complete lack of faith in the anti-trust laws and 
its proposed solution, I do think its point is well taken that 
the Court should not infer from the facts and equities of this 
particular case that no trade licensing agreement could seriously 
disrupt federal patent policy. The matter obviously bears 
e further thought and study. Even if the problems Ecron warns of 
are genuine risks, it may be that preemption is simply not a 
suitable doctrine for dealing with them. 
-
B 
The issue becomes more complicated when a patent ----------------------------
application in involved. If the contract were based solely on 
the existence of a patent, then this case would be like Lear · Inc. 
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). That case establishes that an 
1 agreement to pay royalties on a patented invention becomes 
\ unenforceable if the patent is declared invalid. It is also 
clear that one may not enforce a contract to pay royalties beyond 
the life of a valid patent. Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29 
7. 
- -
- (1964). T~s, if the contract between petr and resp were, as 
resp now argues, made solely in contemplation of a patent, and 
. ------
that patent had issued, the rights and obligations of the parties 
would be clear. 
8. 
The issue presented by this case, however, is whether an ~ 
inventor can make an agreement relying on state contract or trade-
secret law 1!l ~ qlt~rna~ive to federal patent law. Thus, if a 
_,,,--/ 
patent issues, the law described in the preceding paragraph 
governs the enforceability of the contract for royalties. If no 
patent issues, then the contract is governed under the Kewanee 
principles described in part III A above. 
For reasons that are not entirely clear, resp and the 
court below find this to be impermissible. Except for situations 
9 in which state trade-secret protection is invalid in and of 
itself, however, it is not clear to me why a licensor should not 
be able to strike this kind of a bargain. Indeed, it would seem 
that the objectives of patent law would be served especially 
well. The inventor clearly is not deterred from seeking patent 
protection, since that is his first option under the contract. 
And in the event a patent is not awarded, the introduction of the 
idea to the public is hastened since the licensor already is 
using it. 
-
The prior decisions of the Court do not preclude this 
result. The underlying rationale in Lear appears to be that, -------
given · the ·e~istence ·of · a ·patent ·monopoly, there is a strong need 
to allow the licensee to challenge the validity of the patent. 




issued. Lear expres~ly reserved the question of the validity ......___.__ 
under federal law of licenses for unpatented devices, and Kewanee 
now seems to have answered that question in favor of state law. 
Similarly, Brulotte assumed the existence of a patent, and also 
reserved the question of lengthy licenses for unpatented devices. 
In light of Kewanee and the policy arguments advanced by 
petrs and most amipii, there would appear to be no reason not to 
permit a licensor, as a general rule, to invoke state law in 
~
favor of his trade secret in the event patent protection is 
refused. A potentially hard question arises when a patent is - -----..: ,. 
originally issued, but later declared invalid. In that 
circumstance, should a licensor be allowed to revert to his state 
law protection, in spite of the fact that a contract based on 
9 patent rolyalties alone would be unenforceable? The SG says that 
preemption would be proper in this case, and I tend to agree. 
9. 
- See SG's brief at 21 n.8. This question, however, is not before 




I would reverse the decision of the Court below and hold 
that nothing in federal patent law preempts the enforcement of 
the contract between petr and resp. I would read the contract as 
the trial court did: the parties contemplated the issuance of a 
patent, but made independent provisions intended to govern in the 
~ 
event a patent was not forthcoming. I would conclude that the ------ - _.. -------






and that the policies of federal patent law will not be 
frustrated by the enforcement of this agreement. The most 
difficult part of writing an opinion reaching this result would 
be to decide whether the rule against preemption in such cases 
should be a broad or narrow, and, if the latter, how to draw the 
line between acceptable and unacceptable contracts. For the 
reasons state above, I question the soundness of Ercon's 
suggested limiting principle. 
1 0. 
- -
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77-1413 
Jane Aronson, Petitioner, l On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Ap-
Quick Poi11t Pencil Company. peals for the Eighth Circuit. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR. CHIEF JusncE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to consider whether federal patent 
law pre-empts state contract law so as to preclude enforce-
ment of a contract to pay royalties to a patent applicant, on 
sales of articles embodying the putative invention, for so long 
as the contracting party sells them whether or not a patent is 
granted. 
(1) 
In October 1955 the petitioner Mrs. Jane Aronson filed an 
application, Serial No. 542677, for a patent on a new form of 
keyholder. Although ingenious, the design was so simple that 
it readily could be copied unless it was protected by patent. 
I n June 1956, while the patent application was pending, Mrs. 
Aronson negotiated a contract with the respondent, Quick / 
Point Pencil Company, for the manufacture and sale of the 
keyholder. 
The contract was embodied in two documents, the first 
being a letter from Quick Point to Mrs. Aronson. In that 
letter, Quick Point a.greed to pay Mrs. Aronson a royalty of 
5% of the selling price in return for "the exclusive right to 
make and sell keyholders of the type shown in your applica-
tion. Rerial No. 542677.'' The letter further provided that 
the parties would consult one another concerning the steps to 
be t aken " [i]n the event of any infringement." 
y; 
~l ~ 11/ 
- -
77-1413-0PINIO~ 
2 AROXSOX v. QCICK POIXT PEXCIL CO. 
The contract did not require Quick Point to manufacture 
the keyholder. Mrs. Aronson received a $750 advance on 
royalties and was entitled to rescind the exclusive license if 
Quick Point did not sell a million keyholders by the end of 
1957. quick Point retained the right to cancel the agreement 
whenever "the volume of sales does not meet our expectation." 
The duration of the agreement was 11ot otherwise prescribed. 
A secolld, contemporaneous contract documeut provided 
that if Mrs. Aronson 's patent applicati011 ·was "not allowed 
within five (5) years. Quick Point Pencil Co. [would] pay 
two and one half percent (2~~ o/r) of sales ... so long as you 
[Quick Point] continue to sell same."* 
In June 1961. when Mrs. Aronson had failed to obtain a 
patent on the keyhol<ler within the five years specified in the 
agreement of the parties. Quick Point asserted its contractual 
right to reduce royalty payments to 2½%- of sales. In 
September of that year the Patent Office Board of Appeals 
issued a final rejection of the application on the ground that 
the keyholcler was not patentable. and Mrs. Aronson did not 
appeal. Quick Point continued to pay reduced royalties to 
her for 14 years thereafter. 
The market was more receptive to the keyholder's novelty 
and utility than the Patent Office. By September 1975 Quick 
Point had made sales in excess of seven million dollars and 
paid Mrs. Aronson royalties totalling $203,963.84; sales were 
;fln April Hl61, while :Mrs. Aron8on 's patent, application was pending, 
her husband sought, a patPnt on a. tlilfrrpnt. kPyholder and madP plans to 
licPn,m anothPr company to mam1facturP it. Quick Point's attornp>· wrote 
to t.hc couple that tlw propo:,;pd new Iicen::;e would violatP the 1956 agree-
mrnt . HP ob,;erved that: 
">·our licPn::;e agrPnnent is in rn,pect of the disclosurP of said Jane 
f Aron~on 's] :1 pplirc1tion (not me1,el>· i11 re,;pert. of it::; clairru;) :-wd that 
even if no pa.tent, is ever granted on the .Tane [Aron::;onl application , 
Quick Point Peru:il Company is obligated to pay royalties in l'espect of 
any keyholder manufactured by it in accordance with any di:sclosu.re of 
saicl application ." (Empha,,;is ctdded.) 
- -
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continuing to rise. However, while Quick Point was able to 
pre-empt the market in the earlier years and was long the 
only manufacturer of the Aronson keyholder, copies began to 
appear in the late 1960's. Quick Point's competitors, of 
course, were not required to pay royalties for their use of the 
design. Quick Point's share of the Aronson keyholder market 
has declined during the past decade. 
(2) 
In November 1975 Quick Point commenced an action in / 
the United Sta.tes District Court for a declaratory judgment. 
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2201, that the royalty agreement 
was unenforceable. Quick Point asserted that state law which 
might otherwise make the contract enforceable was pre-
empted by federal patent law. This is the only issue presented 
to us for decision . 
Both parties moved for summary judgment on affidavits, 
exhibits. and stipulations of fact. The District Court con-
cluded that the "language of the agreement is plain, clear and 
unequivocal and has no relation as to whether or not a patent 
is ever granted." Accordingly, it held that the agreement 
was valid, and that Quick Point was obliged to pay the a.greed 
royalties pursuant to the contract so long as it manufactured 
the keyholder. 
The Court of Appea.ls reversed, one judge dissenting. It 
held that Mrs. Aronson 's effort to obtain a patent estopped her I 
from denying that patent law principles governed her contract 
with Quick Point. Although acknowledging that this Court 
had never decided the precise issue. the Court of Appeals held 
that our prior decisions regarding patent licenses compelled 
the conclusion that Quick Point's contract with Mrs. Aronson 
became unenforceable once she failed to obtain a patent within 
the stipulated five-year period. The court found that a con- \ 
tin uing obligation to pay royalties would be contrary to "the 
strong federal policy in favor of the full and free use of ideas, 
in the public domain ," Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653, 674 
- -
77- 1413-0PINION 
4 ARONSON v. QUICK POINT PENCIL CO. 
(1969) . The court also observed that if Mrs. Aronson actually 
had obtained a patent, Quick Point would have escaped its 
royalty obligations either if the patent were held to be invalid, 
id., at 674, or upon its expiration after 17 years under Brulotte 
v. Thys Co., 379 U. S. 29 (1964). Accordingly. it concluded 
that a licensee should be relieved of royalty obligations when 
the licensor's efforts to obtain a contemplated patent prove 
unsuccessful. 
The parties contracted with full awareness of both the \ 
pendency of a patent application and the possibility that a 
patent might not issue. The clause de-escalating the royalty 
by half in the event no patent issued within five years makes 
that crystal clear. Quick Point apparently placed a signifi-
cant value on capitalizing on the basic novelty of the device, 
even if no patent issued; its success in exploiting the key- \ 
holder demonstrates that this judgment was reasonable. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the initial letter and the commit-
ment to pay a 5% royalty was in contemplation of and was 
subject to federal patent law. the provisions relating to the 
2%% royalty were explicitly independent of patent law. T'he 
cases and principles relied on by the Court of Appeals and 
Quick Point do not bear on a contract that does not rely on a 
patent, particularly where, as here, the contracting parties 
agreed expressly as to alternative obligati011s if no patent \ 
should issue. 
(3) 
Commercial agreements traditionally are the domain of 
state law; state law is not displaced merely because the 
contract relates to intellectual property which may or may 
not be patentable. The states are free to regulate the use of 
such intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent with 
federal law. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. , 416 U. S. 470, 
479 (1974); see Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973). 
In this as in other fields, the question of whether federa1 law 
pre-empts state law "involves a consideration of whether that. 
D .-.. ,sr, il"' 
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law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941)." Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., supra. If it does not, state law governs. 
In Kewanee Oil Co., we reviewed the purposes of the federal 
patent system. First, patent Jaw seeks to foster and reward 
invention; second. it promotes disclosure of inventions, to 
stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to 
practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the 
stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure 
that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use 
of the public. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., supra, at 
480--481. 
Enforcement of Quick Point's agreement with Mrs. Aronson 
D.,,,.,.,S>l<.51" 
is not inconsistent with any of these aims. Permitting in-
ventors to make enforceable agreements licensing the use of 
their inventions in return for royalties provides an additional 
incentive to invention. Similarly, encouraging Mrs. Arsonson 
to make arrangements for the manufacture of her keyholder 
furthers the federal policy of disclosure of inventions; these \ 
simple devices display the novel idea which they embody 
wherever they are seen . c, r,,,., i-. s I i--
Quick Point argues that enforcement of such contracts 
conflicts with the federal policy against withdrawing ideas 
from the public domain by allowing states to extend "per-
petual protection to articles too lacking in novelty to merit 
any patent at all under federal constitutional standards," 
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964), 
and hence discourages recourse to the federal patent system. 
vVe find no merit in either contention. Enforcement of 
this agreement does not withdraw any idea from the public 
domain. The design for the keyholder was not in the public 
domain before the parties contracted at arm's length. See 
K ewanee Oil Co. , supra, at 484. In negotiating the agree- 1 
ment, Mrs. Aronson disclosed the design in confidence. Had 
- -
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Quick Point tried to exploit the design in breach of that 
confidence, it would have risked legal liability. It is equally 
clear that as a result of the agreement_. the manufacture and 
sale of the keyholders and the subsequent denial of Mrs. 
Aronson's patent application, the design entered the public 
domain. 
Requiring Quick Point to bear the burden of royalties for 
the use of the design is no more inconsistent with federal 
patent law than any of the other costs involved iii being the 
first to introduce a new product to · the market, such as 
research and development expenditures and marketing and 
promotional expenses. For reasons which Quick Point's ex-
perience with the Aronson keyholder demonstrate, innovative 
entrepeneurs have usually found such costs to be well worth 
payrng. 
Finally, enforcement of this agreement does not discourage 
anyone from seeking a patent. Mrs. Aronson attempted to 
obtain a patent for over five years. It is quite true that had 
she succeeded. she would have received a 5% royalty only on 
keyholders sold during the 17-year life of the patent. Off-
setting the limited term of royalty payments, she and Quick 
Point would have been able to license any others who pro-
duced the same keyholder. Which course would have pro-
duced the greater yield to the contracting parties is a matter 
of speculation; the parties resolved the uncertainties by their-
bargain. 
(4) \ 
No decisions of this Court relating to patents justify reliev-
ing Quick Point of its contract obligations. We have held 
that a State may not forbid the copying of an idea in the 
public domain which does not meet the requirements for 
federal patent protection. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stifjel 
Co., 376 U. S. 225 (1974). Enforcement of Quick Point's 
.agreement, however, does not prevent anyone from copying: 
- -
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i'he keyholder. It merely requires Quick Point to pay the 
consideration which it promised in return for the use of a new 
and secret invention which enabled it to pre-empt the ma.rket. 
In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), we held that 
a person licensed to use a patent may challenge the validity of 
the patent, and that a licensee who establishes that the patent 
is invalid need not pa.y the royalties accrued under the licens-
ing agreement subsequent to the issuance of the patent. Both 
holdings relied on the desirability of encouraging licensees to 
challenge the validity of patents. to further the strong federal 
policy that only inventions which meet the rigorous require-
ments of patentability shall be withdrawu from the public 
domain. Id., at 670-671 , 673-674. Accordingly, neither the 
holding nor the rationale of Lear control when no patent has \ 
issued. and no ideas have been withdrawn from public use. 
Enforcement of the royalty agreement here is also consist-
ent with the principles treated in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 
U. S. 29 ( 1964). There. we held that the obligation to pay 
royalties in return for the use of a patented device may not 
extend beyond the life of the patent. The principle under-
lying that holding was simply that the monopoly granted 
under a patent cannot lawfully be used to "negotiate with the 
leverage of that monopoly." The Court emphasized that to 
" use that leverage to project those royalty payments beyond 
the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the 
monopoly of a patent .... " Id., at 33. Here the reduced 
royalty which is challenged, far from being negotiated "with l 
the leverage" of a patent. rested on the contingency that no 
patent would issue within five years. 
No doubt a pending patent application gives the applicant 
some additional bargaining power for purposes of negotiating 
a royalty agreement. The pending application allows the 
inventor to hold out the hope of an exclusive right to exploit 
the idea. as well as the threat that the other party will be 
prevented from using the idea for 17 years. However, the ( 
- -
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amount of leverage arising from a patent applicatioll depends 
on how likely the parties consider it to be that a valid patent 
will issue. Here, where no patent ever issued, the record is o VV' ' s:s;-, J-... 
entirely clear that the parties assigned a substantial likelihood 
to that contingency, because they specifically provided for a 
reduced royalty in the event no patent issued within five years. \ 
This case does not require us to draw the line between what 
constitutes abuse of a pending application and what does not. 
It is clear that whatever role the pending application played 
in the negotiation of the 5% royalty, it played no part in the 
contract to pay the 21/1 % royalty indefinitely. 
Our holding in Kewanee Oil Co., supra, puts to rest the \ 
contention that federal law pre-empts and renders unenforce-
able the con tract made by these parties. There we held that 
state law forbidding the misappropriation of trade secrets was 
not pre-empted by federal patent law. We observed: 
"Certainly the patent policy of encouraging invention 
is not disturbed by the existence of another form of 
incentive to invention. In this respect the two systems 
[patent and trade secrets law J are not and never would 
be in conflict." Id. , at 484. 
Enforcement of this royalty agreement is even less offensive 
to federal patent policies than state law protecting trade 
secrets. The most commonly accepted definition of trade 
secrets is restricted to confidential information which is not 
disclosed in the normal process of exploitation. See Restate-
ment of Torts § 757, comment b (1939). Accordingly, the 
exploitation of trade secrets under state law ma,y not satisfy 
the federal policy in favor of disclosure, whereas disclosure is 
inescapable in exploiting a device like the Aronson keyholder. 
Enforcement of these contractual obliga.tions, freely under-
taken in arm's length negotiation and with no fixed reliance 
on a pa.tent or a probable pa.tent grant, will: 
"encourage illvention in areas where pa.tent law does not 
reach. and will prompt the independent innova.tor to 
- -
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proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his inven-
tion. Competition is fostered and the public is not 
deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite patentable, 
invention." [Footnote omitted.] Kewanee Oil Co., 
supra, at 485. 
The device which is the subject of the contract here ceased 
to have any secrecy as soon as it was first marketed; yet 
when the contract was negotiated the inventiveness and 
novelty were sufficiently apparent to induce an experienced 
novelty manufacturer to agree to pay for the initial exclu-
sivity on the terms adopted by the parties for the opportunity 
to be first in the market. Federal patent law is not a barrier \ 
to such a contract. 
Reversed. 
- -
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JUSTICE JOHN PAU L STEVENS 
January 22, 1979 
Re: 77-1413 - Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
I 
The Chie f Just ice 
Copies to the Conference 
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JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
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RE: No. 77-1413 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. 
Dear Chief: 
I agree. 
The Chief Justice 











Date: January 23, 1979 
No. 77-1413 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. 
I believe the Chief's opinion in Aronson 
generally is on the mark. I have only a few minor 
reservations: 
1.) The opinion fails to note a difficult -question that this decision properly leaves unresolved: 
What result if the Aronson patent had issued, but subsequently 
were declared invaltd in court? That case would fall midway 
~ 
between this Aronson and Lear. It would not be advisable 
to address the issue now, but it might be wise to show that 
this Court is aware of what lies down the road. 
2.) The opinion ~ s that once Aronson's -key ring was marketed, it was easily copied by any competitor; 
/A therefore 
f / public in 
there was no withholding of information from the 
contravention of federal patent policy. It is not 
clear to me whether the Chief believes the case might come 
out differently if the federal disclosure policy were not 
so clearly supported by the contract in this case. Kewanee 
- -
2. 
suggested that even if disclosure might be inhibited to 
some extent by state-law protection of trade secrets, 
pre-emption was still improper. I don'~ imagine the 
Chief is backtracking from his Kewanee position, but the 
emphasis in this opinion on the disclosure policy arguably 
could intimate such a retreat. 
3.) The opinion doesn't appear to anticipate 
the kind of problem raised in Ercon's amicus brief: that 
contracts such as this could be inconsistent with federal 
policy if the product of unequal bargaining power. There 
was no such problem in this case, but had I written the opinion, 
I might have left open the possibility of a different result 
if the contract were shown to be the product of market leverage 




None of these reservations go to the substance 
of the opinion. The only question is whether any of them 
~ important enough to call to the Chief's attention. 
£-,c.--
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I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court. 
The Chief Justice 
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January 23, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1413-Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
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Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
(1~ 
The Chief Justice 
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January 24, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1413 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
., >i /,. ./ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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C HAMBERS OF 
TH E C H IEF JUSTIC E 
February 21, 1979 
Re: 77-1413 - Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am making some belated stylistic changes in 
this case so it will nou come down tomorrow. 
cc: Mr. Cornio 
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